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Executive Summary 
 
The idea of establishing an additional EMU fiscal capacity with an own central budget is one 
of the core ideas in the debate on how to create a “genuine economic and monetary union”. 
What in concrete terms is to be understood by an additional fiscal capacity is rather vague 
and covers a wide range of options. On the one hand, it can be understood as an additional 
fund that assists participating (eurozone) Member States in their efforts to enhance their 
competitiveness. This could be reached by the conclusion of so-called “contractual 
arrangements” by Member States with the EU. Those Member States that comply with what 
they promised to do in these “contractual arrangements” are eligible for financial assistance 
from that fund. If a Member States fails to comply the fund could withhold financial 
assistance. By this mechanism, the additional fiscal capacity can be understood as an 
incentive-based enforcement measure for a Europeanised economic policy. 
 
On the other hand, the additional fiscal capacity can be understood in broader terms as “an 
insurance-type mechanism between euro area countries to buffer large country-specific 
economic shocks”. Such an understanding requires extended revenue for the budget of the 
additional fiscal capacity. It requires certain conditions for payment and an extended 
administration which was called by the proposals a “Treasury”. The European Council did 
not mention this understanding in its conclusions of 14 December 2012. 
 
There are several legal options for the implementation of an additional EMU fiscal capacity 
that covers such a wide range of implementation options. This note distinguishes for the 
assessment of the legal options between the budgetary implications, the legal implications 
of the “contractual arrangements” (which is the core issue of the incentive-based 
understanding of the additional fiscal capacity) and the institutional implications of further 
developments of the additional fiscal capacity. 
 
The additional EMU fiscal capacity can be implemented within the EU budget. A 
differentiation of revenue and expenditure with regard to a group of Member States is 
possible under EU budget law. Certain revenue can be assigned to a certain budget line. 
Such earmarked revenue is not part of the Multiannual Financial Framework. It appears 
also to be possible to implement the additional fiscal capacity outside of the EU budget. In 
this situation, however, the European Parliament must have supervisory rights over the 
budget of the fiscal capacity comparable to those under EU budget law. Otherwise the 
European Parliament’s budgetary rights that are protected under EU budget law would be 
circumvented. 
 
“Contractual arrangements” between Member States and EU institutions can be understood 
either as international law Treaties, contracts governed by private or public law or legally 
non-binding Memoranda of Understanding. An overall assessment of the legal framework of 
EU law only allows an understanding of “contractual arrangements” as legally non-binding 
“Memoranda of Understanding” that serve as cause for payments. With regard to 
international law Treaties it is already doubtful whether the EU has the competence to 
conclude Treaties with its Member States as the Treaties provide for legal bases to adopt 
regulations, directives and decision that address Member States. The conclusion of 
international law Treaties would either undermine the legislative procedure foreseen by the 
existing legal bases or the principle of conferral if there is no legal basis in the Treaties. The 
proposals themselves only refer to an endorsement of the national parliament where 
appropriate under national procedures and not to a ratification as required by international 
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law. A comparison with the existing secondary law and, in particular, with the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure shows that the conclusion of “contractual 
arrangements” does not provide for any additional legal consequence for the concluding 
Member States. Member States under the corrective arm of the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure have to present a corrective action plan that is monitored by the European 
Commission and whose non-compliance has legal consequences which include fines. 
“Contractual arrangements” that shall contain the measures proposed by the corrective 
action plan only give access to an additional financial support by the fiscal capacity. 
Member States that are not under the corrective arm of the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure are supposed to include measures comparable to a corrective action plan into 
their “contractual arrangements”. Non-compliance has, however, no further consequences 
except for the possibility for the fiscal capacity to withhold payments. This shows that 
“contractual arrangements” are not intended to create additional legal obligations for 
Member States and resemble therefore legally non-binding “Memoranda of Understanding”. 
 
Further developments of the additional EMU fiscal capacity require new revenue and 
challenge the institutional framework and balance of the EU. Revenue can be generated 
either by contributions from Member States or new own resources such as an own EU tax. 
Whilst contributions could be introduced under existing EU law, an own EU tax whose 
purpose is to generate revenue for the EU can not be established under the EU Treaties. 
Existing EU law requires payments to EMU Member States to be subject to a strict 
conditionality. However, the European Commission needs to be adapted to its possible new 
role as EU Treasury. Democratic accountability of the European Commission acting as EU 
Treasury also requires changes in the institutional set-up. 
 
In sum, the debate on the additional EMU fiscal capacity raises important questions for the 
further development of the EMU towards a genuine economic and monetary union. Certain 
elements of the ideas proposed by the four Presidents and the European Commission can 
already be realised under the existing Treaties. EU budget law, in particular, requires a 
strong involvement of the European Parliament when implementing the additional EMU 
fiscal capacity. 
 
 
Background and Aims 
On 26 June 2012 the president of the European Council proposed in the report “Towards a 
genuine economic and monetary union” under the title of “an integrated budgetary 
framework” the creation of an additional EMU fiscal capacity. Since then the idea was 
further developed by two more reports presented by the four Presidents (Herman van 
Rompuy, President of the European Council, in collaboration with José Manuel Barroso, 
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Eurogroup, 
Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank) on 12 October 2012 and on 5 
December 2012.  The European Commission presented, furthermore, some ideas on the 
additional EMU fiscal capacity in its “Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union – Launching a European Debate” (COM(2012) 777 final/2). The European 
Council picked up the idea of an additional EMU fiscal capacity in its conclusions of 14 
December 2012 under the name of a “solidarity mechanisms”. 
 
The purpose of this note is to assess the legal options for the possible implementation of 
such an additional EMU fiscal capacity and the institutional implications of it. The proposals 
made by the four Presidents as well as the blueprint of the European Commission are the 
basis for this assessment. 
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1. THE ADDITIONAL FISCAL CAPACITY: DIFFERENT 
CONCEPTIONS 
1.1. The development of the idea of a “fiscal capacity” 
 
1.1.1. Proposals made by the President of the European Council on 26 June 2012 
 
The report “Towards a genuine economic and monetary union”, presented by the president 
of the European Council on 26 June 2012 proposed initially under the title of “an integrated 
budgetary framework” the creation of an additional fiscal capacity (van Rompuy 2012a: 6): 
 
“A fully-fledged fiscal union would imply the development of a stronger capacity at the 
European level, capable to manage economic interdependences, and ultimately the 
development at the Euro area level of a fiscal body, such as a treasury office. In 
addition, the appropriate role and functions of a central budget, including its 
articulation with national budgets, will have to be defined.” 
 
1.1.2. Further developments in the interim report of 12 October 2012 
 
The interim report of 12 October 2012 specified that the fiscal capacity “would support new 
fiscal functions which are not covered by the multiannual financial framework.” In order to 
implement it, “ways to develop this capacity within the framework of the EU and its 
institutions will have to be examined.” The functions of the fiscal capacity could be “to 
facilitate adjustments to country-specific shocks by providing for some degree of absorption 
at the central level” and “structural reforms that improve competitiveness and potential 
growth” without “water[ing] down the compliance with fiscal rules and fiscal discipline in 
individual Member States”. The fiscal capacity should, finally, have an “ability to borrow” 
(van Rompuy 2012b: 5). 
 
The interim report also presented the idea of “individual arrangements of a contractual 
nature” which euro area Member States should conclude with “EU institutions” “on the 
reforms promoting growth and jobs”. The content of these contractual arrangements “could 
be linked to the reforms identified in the country-specific recommendations of the Council 
and built on EU procedures, such as the corrective action plans under the excessive 
imbalances procedure or the economic partnership programmes.” At this stage, the idea of 
the contractual arrangements was not yet linked to the idea of the “fiscal capacity” (van 
Rompuy 2012b: 7). 
 
1.1.3. The blueprint of the European Commission 
 
On 28 November 2012 the European Commission presented its blueprint for a deep and 
genuine economic and monetary union. The European Commission split the idea of the 
President of the European Council on the “fiscal capacity” into two: A “Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument” (European Commission 2012: 21) and a “proper fiscal 
capacity for the euro area” (European Commission 2012: 27 and 31). 
1.1.3.1. Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument 
 
The Commission merged the idea of “contractual arrangements” with the idea of a “fiscal 
capacity” in the “Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument”. Euro area Member States 
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entering into a contractual arrangement with the Commission could get financial support for 
“reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member State in question and 
for the good functioning of EMU”. If the Commission finds ex post that a Member State did 
not fulfil its duties under the contract the financial support can be withheld. According to 
the Commission the instrument “could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget” and 
be established by secondary law on the basis of either Article 136 TFEU (if it reinforces the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (hereinafter: MIP) under Regulation (EU) No 
1176/2011) or of Article 352 TFEU by enhanced cooperation. The instrument could be 
financed by either a commitment of the euro area Member States or by a legal obligation to 
that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation “as assigned revenues” 
(European Commission 2012: 22).  
1.1.3.2. A proper fiscal capacity for the euro area 
 
The fiscal capacity for the euro area should be a further development of the “convergence 
and competitiveness instrument”. It shall, however, rely solely on own resources. Such a 
fiscal capacity should probably include “the capacity to borrow and issue bonds” (European 
Commission 2012: 32). Its tasks could be to “support adjustment to asymmetric shocks, 
[facilitate] stronger economic integration and convergence and [avoid] the setting up of 
long-term transfer flows” (European Commission 2012: 31). A stabilisation instrument built 
on the fiscal capacity “could provide an insurance system” (European Commission 2012: 
32). The Commission then presents two different schemes on how such a stabilisation 
mechanism could work: Either as an asymmetric shock absorption capacity or as a counter-
cyclical economic tool (comparable to the US unemployment benefit system). In order to 
realise such a fiscal capacity, Treaty changes are needed such as at least the creation of an 
explicit legal basis for its establishment, creating a corresponding, dedicated budgetary and 
own resources procedure and creating a new taxation power at the EU level, or a power to 
raise revenue by indebting itself on the markets (European Commission 2012: 33). 
 
1.1.4. The final report of the President of the European Council of 5 December 2012 
 
In his final report the President of the European Council summarised the development of 
the idea on the “fiscal capacity”. Following the Commission blueprint the final report 
distinguishes between “financial incentives” for Member States that “enter into 
arrangements of a contractual nature with EU institutions” and “an insurance-type 
mechanism between euro area countries to buffer large country-specific economic shocks” 
(van Rompuy 2012c: 7). With regard to latter the final report distinguishes two possible 
approaches for its function: A macroeconomic approach “where contributions and 
disbursements would be based on fluctuations in cyclical revenue and expenditure items” 
(van Rompuy 2012c: 8) and a microeconomic approach that would work “as a complement 
or partial substitute to national unemployment insurance systems” (van Rompuy 2012c: 9).  
 
1.1.5. Conclusions of the European Council (13/14 December 2012) 
 
In its conclusions the European Council only referred to the “fiscal capacity” in its form of 
“financial incentives” for Member States concluding contracts with EU institutions on 
structural and fiscal reforms. The second type of “fiscal capacity” was not mentioned 
anymore. There shall be “solidarity mechanisms that can enhance the efforts made by the 
Member States that enter into […] contractual arrangements for competitiveness and 
growth.” These “contractual arrangements” are “individual arrangements of a contractual 
nature with EU institutions […]. Such arrangements should be differentiated depending on 
Member States’ specific situations. This would engage all euro area Member States, but non 
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euro Member States may also choose to enter into similar arrangements” (European 
Council 2012: 5). 
1.2. Distinctive elements of the conceptions 
 
In order to properly assess the legal options for an implementation of the idea of an 
“additional fiscal capacity” the following elements should be distinguished: 
 
 The budgetary element: The budget of the fiscal capacity can be designed differently 
(either included into the EU budget or as a separate fund). The chosen budgetary 
design has institutional implications with regard to the involvement of the European 
Commission when implementing the fiscal capacity and of the European Parliament 
when controlling the fiscal capacity. 
 
 The conditionality element: In order to receive financial assistance from the fiscal 
capacity Member States have to meet certain conditions, in particular, the conclusion of 
“contractual arrangements”. The answers to the question of the legal nature of these 
“contractual arrangements” (international law Treaties, private law contracts or 
Memoranda of Understanding), of who concludes these arrangements on behalf of the 
EU following which procedures, of how these arrangements are implemented and of 
who controls these implementations have different institutional implications. 
 
 The development element: All conceptions include as starting point a fiscal capacity 
that grants financial assistance for Member States that concluded “contractual 
arrangements” with EU institutions. They differ, however, with regard to the further 
development of the fiscal capacity. Further developments of the additional fiscal 
capacity perpetuate a two-speed Europe of the euro area and the non-euro area, 
require major Treaty changes and challenge the functioning of EU institutions made for 
the whole EU but taking over more and more tasks for the euro area Member States. 
 
2. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR AN ADDITIONAL FISCAL 
CAPACITY WITH REGARD TO BUDGET LAW 
 
Budgetary implications of the additional fiscal capacity are closely linked to the way how it 
is supposed to be implemented (2.1). The legal framework of the existing Treaties will 
already eliminate some of the possible ways of implementing the fiscal capacity (2.2) which 
allows for a final view on the budgetary implications and the associated institutional 
implications (2.3). 
2.1. Different ways of implementing the fiscal capacity 
 
Implementing the fiscal capacity can either be realised by means of the Community method 
according to which the Commission implements the budget for the additional fiscal capacity 
controlled by the European Parliament and the Council (2.1.1), or by a fund outside of the 
EU budget, which is either implemented by the European Commission (2.1.2) or a new 
separate agency (2.1.3). 
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2.1.1. Community method: New own resource within EU budget  
 
The use of the “Community method” would require including the budget for the additional 
fiscal capacity into the EU budget. This could be realised by creating a new own resource, 
which has to be financed by contributions of the Member States participating in the fiscal 
capacity, and a new budget line for financing the functions of the fiscal capacity. As a part 
of the general EU budget the budget for the additional fiscal capacity would be 
implemented by the European Commission and supervised by the European Parliament and 
the Council. This requires, in principle, an integration of the fiscal capacity into the multi-
annual financial framework as Article 312(1) TFEU states that the annual budget of the 
Union shall comply with the multi-annual financial framework unless the fiscal capacity is 
subject to an exception provided for in the financial framework.  
 
2.1.2. Fund outside of the EU budget implemented by the European Commission 
 
The budget for the additional fiscal capacity could also be a fund outside of the EU budget, 
which is implemented by the European Commission. The European Parliament could give 
discharge for the financial management. This way is based on the model of the European 
Development Fund (hereinafter EDF). The European Parliament could, furthermore, take on 
a supervisory role comparable to the one that it has with regard to the general EU budget. 
 
2.1.3. Fund outside of the EU budget implemented by a new separate agency 
 
A new separate agency implementing the budget for the additional fiscal capacity could be 
created either on the legal basis of Article 352 TFEU in enhanced cooperation of the 
participating Member States or on the basis of an international Treaty between the 
participating Member States. Within the concept of the creation of a new agency the type 
and degree of supervision can also be distinguished: It can be either an own budget 
committee, which is separate from the European Parliament and the Council and which is 
composed by representatives of the participating Member States (modelled after the “Office 
for Harmonisation in the Internal Market”), the European Parliament discharging the 
financial management of the agency without supervising the implementation or the 
European Parliament as a supervisory body comparable to the EU budget. 
 
2.1.4. Summary table on possible concepts 
 
  Implementing body 
  European Commission Agency 
European Parliament 
(supervision comp. to EU budget) 
Community method Model EBA 
European Parliament 
(discharging the financial management) 
Model EDF Model modified EDF 
S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
od
y 
Budget Committee 
(composed by Member States)  Model OHMI 
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2.2. Legal framework 
 
The legal framework sets limits to the above-mentioned concepts. In order to realise the 
fiscal capacity outside of the EU budget the Treaties should provide for an appropriate legal 
base or should not prevent the conclusion of an international agreement (2.2.1). Once the 
fiscal capacity could be established outside of the EU budget the question arises as to 
whether such a fiscal capacity would not infringe EU budget law and, in particular, the 
principle of unity of the EU budget and its completeness (2.2.2) and if there is any possible 
design of the fiscal capacity outside of the EU budget that would constitute a permissible 
exception to this principle (2.2.3). Finally, a possible solution within the general EU budget 
would require that a differentiation between Member States in the EU budget is legally 
possible (2.2.4). 
 
2.2.1. Legal basis for the establishment of a fund outside of the EU budget and an 
implementing agency 
 
A legal basis for the establishment of a fund outside of the EU budget and of an agency, 
which implements it, can be found in Article 352 TFEU. The functions of the fund as 
proposed by the President of the European Council serve to attain a “sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth” and to safeguard the 
“economic and monetary union whose currency is the Euro”; objectives mentioned by 
Article 3 TEU.  
 
Besides an action based on Article 352 TFEU, participating Member States could also 
establish the fund on the basis of an international Treaty. The principle of sincere 
cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU requires, however, that Member States shall give a legal 
action under the Treaties and by using enhanced cooperation priority over the conclusion of 
an international Treaty outside of the EU framework. 
 
2.2.2. General principle of unity of the EU budget and its completeness  
 
The core rule of the financial provisions of the Union is Article 310(1) TFEU according to 
which “all items of revenue and expenditure of the Union shall be included in estimates to 
be drawn up for each financial year and shall be shown in the budget.” This general 
provision is specified by the regulation on the financial rules applicable to the general 
budget of the Union1. Art. 4(1) of the 2002 regulation as well as Art. 2(c) of the 2012 
regulation define “budget” as “the instrument which, for each financial year, forecasts and 
authorises all revenue and expenditure considered necessary for the Union”.  
 
These provisions establish the principle of unity of the EU budget. This principle requires 
that all revenues and expenditures of the Union are part of one EU budget. It forbids any 
kind of separate or subsidiary budget within the EU framework. The principle of unity 
includes the completeness of the EU budget which requires that the one EU budget which is 
established under the principle of unity is complete and includes every predictable revenue 
and expenditure of the Union. 
 
                                          
1 The current regulation is the Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 which is repealed by the 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
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2.2.3. Exceptions to the general principle 
 
Exceptions to the principle of unity of the EU budget and its completeness can nevertheless 
be found. These are: 
 
 The European Investment Bank 
 The European Central Bank 
 The European Stability Mechanism 
 certain Union agencies  
 The European Development Fund 
 Borrowing-and-lending operations entered into by the Union 
 Expenditure resulting from implementation of enhanced cooperation  
 
In general, these exceptions are highly questionable. However, there can be exceptions as 
the scope of application of Article 310(1) TFEU requires that the revenue and expenditure 
in question are those of the “Union”. Any revenue or expenditure that is not of the “Union” 
is not subject to the EU budget law.  
 
This view has been confirmed by the European Court of Justice in its judgment of 2 March 
1994 on the European Development Fund (ECJ 1994). The ECJ found in this judgment that 
the EDF is a fund that has been set up by the Member States and not by the Council and 
that accordingly the expenditure is assumed directly by the Member States and not the 
Community. Therefore, expenditure of the EDF is no expenditure of today’s Union under 
Article 310(1) TFEU. The Member States had the competence to set up such a fund since 
“the Community’s competence in that field is not exclusive. The Member States are 
accordingly entitled to enter into commitments themselves vis-à-vis non-member States, 
either collectively or individually or even jointly with the Community” (para 26). 
 
Every exception, however, restricts the budgetary powers of, in particular, the European 
Parliament. An exception to Article 310(1) TFEU has to be interpreted narrowly as the 
purpose of Article 310(1) TFEU is the protection of the budgetary powers of the Council 
and, in particular, the European Parliament. The Treaties have very delicately balanced the 
participation rights of the European Parliament and the Council in the Union’s budgetary 
procedure with the decision-making procedure under Article 314 TFEU, the discharge duty 
of the Commission towards the European Parliament under Article 319 TFEU and the 
adoption of the financial rules regulation in the ordinary legislative procedure under Article 
322 TFEU. Especially the strong position of the European Parliament as the representative 
of the Union citizens (Article 10 TEU) exercising budgetary functions jointly with the Council 
(Article 14(1) TEU) could be undermined by a restrictive interpretation of Article 310(1) 
TFEU which would allow separate budgets within the EU framework but outside of EU 
budget law. The Council as the representative of the governments of the Member States 
does not need a comparable protection as Member States’ governments are also involved in 
the decision on public spending outside of the Union framework. It could, however, be 
otherwise if not all the Member States which participate in the Council take part in 
decisions on public spending. 
 
Furthermore, with the Lisbon Treaty entering into force the core provision of Article 310 
TFEU replaced former Article 268 EC and extended its scope of application. Whilst Article 
268 EC referred to all items of revenue and expenditure of the “Community” and to certain 
parts of certain policies of the former Union Article 310(1) TFEU applies to the Union as a 
whole and abolishes by that every formerly known budgetary differentiation within in the 
EU framework. 
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In order to further assess possible exceptions with regard to their applicability to possible 
configurations of the fiscal capacity an in-depth analysis of the existing exceptions to the 
principle of unity of the EU budget and its completeness is needed. 
2.2.3.1. Exceptions based on a legal personality separate from the European Union 
 
The EIB (Article 308(1) TFEU) and the ECB (Article 282(3) TFEU) have their own budgets 
because of their legal personality which is granted by the Treaties and separate from the 
legal personality of the European Union (Article 335 TFEU). A consequence of this legal 
personality is the financial autonomy of the EIB and the ECB. This exception to the principle 
of unity of the EU budget and its completeness appears to be acceptable as the Treaties 
provided for the legal personality and the financial autonomy of these institutions. 
 
The same reasoning was applied to the financial autonomy of Union agencies. Those 
agencies were founded on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and were granted an own legal 
personality. A series of these Union agencies have their own budgets, which are separate 
from the EU budget, and an own budget committee, which is separate from the European 
Parliament and the Council. This committee is composed by representatives of the Member 
States and sometimes also of the Commission, which are instructed to supervise. If the 
Union pays a subsidy to this Union agency this subsidy is a part of the general budget of 
the EU. All other revenues are not considered to be revenues under Article 310(1) TFEU 
and are therefore outside of the EU budget. Examples for these kinds of Union agencies 
are: 
 
 Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (cf. Articles 138 et seqq. of 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 
 Community Plant Variety Office (cf. Articles 108 et seqq. of Regulation (EC) No 
2100/94) 
 European Aviation Safety Agency (cf. Articles 59 et seqq. Of Regulation (EC) No 
216/2008) 
 
The creation of own budgets which are separate from the general EU budget for Union 
agencies is, however, problematic with regard to Article 310(1) TFEU. The reasoning which 
was used for the EIB and the ECB cannot be applied to Union agencies. Whilst the separate 
legal personality of the EIB and the ECB was granted by the Treaties and, by that, by the 
same source that granted a legal personality to the EU, the legal personality of Union 
agencies derives from secondary law. Secondary law is based on competences that are 
conferred upon the Union and, by that, the legal personality of Union agencies derives from 
the legal personality of the Union. This is confirmed by the regulation on the financial rules 
applicable to the general budget of the Union. Art. 185 of the 2002 regulation as well as 
Art. 208 of the 2012 regulation apply this regulation to Union agencies. This regulation is 
based on Article 322 TFEU and specifies Article 310 TFEU. It can therefore only be applied 
to revenue and expenditure of the Union. If the Union agencies, however, are separate 
from the Union, the regulation on financial rules could not be applied to those agencies. 
 
Furthermore, and more important, financial autonomy of Union agencies undermines the 
control function of the general budget and, by that, the budgetary sovereignty of the 
European Parliament and the Council. This could only be prevented if there was a 
comparable control by the European Parliament and the Council over these Union agencies. 
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Finally, Article 310(1) TFEU addresses the “Union” as a whole. Union agencies are part of 
the Union even though they are autonomous. The basic act of these Union agencies state 
therefore “the Office shall be a body of the Community” (cf. e.g. Article 115 of Regulation 
(EC) No 207/2009 on the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market). As a part of the 
Union these agencies also have to be a part of Union budget. 
 
For all those reasons modern Union agencies such as the European Banking Authority 
(hereinafter: EBA) provide for a budgetary control by the European Parliament comparable 
to the one of the general EU budget (cf. Articles 62 et seqq. of Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority)).  
2.2.3.2. Exceptions based on tasks outside of EU’s competences 
 
Another exception is the European Stability Mechanism. Revenue and expenditure of the 
ESM are not included in the EU budget and are not subject to EU budget law. This is due to 
the fact that the tasks conferred upon the ESM are tasks that are outside of EU’s 
competences. As a Union institution, the ESM would be in conflict with the so-called “no 
bail-out”-clause in Article 125(1) TFEU and, possibly, with the ban on direct public sector 
financing in Article 123 TFEU. Therefore, the Member States have enabled themselves to 
establish a stability mechanism by Primary law with the adoption of Article 136(3) TFEU. 
The Union is not covered by the new Article 136(3) TFEU. Due to the fact that the Treaties 
do not enable the Union (or, in other words, forbid the Union) to set up such a stability 
mechanism the ESM cannot be covered by Article 310 TFEU.2 
2.2.3.3. Exceptions based on tasks with competences shared between EU and Member 
States vis-à-vis third countries 
 
The establishment of the EDF outside of the EU budget was accepted by the ECJ in the 
above-mentioned judgment (ECJ 1994). The Court’s reasoning was based on the 
competence categories. According to the Court’s judgment in the ERTA case (ECJ 1971) if 
there is an exclusive Union competence “Member States no longer have the right, acting 
individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries” which affect 
rules that were based on exclusive competences of the Union. On the contrary, as long as 
the Union has no exclusive competence Member States are entitled to exercise their 
competence in a specific policy field such as development policy and to perform any 
obligation. The Court draws a line between competence and expenditure. If there is a 
shared competence which allows Member States to act outside of the EU framework then 
there can also be Member States’ expenditure outside of the EU budget. 
 
This reasoning of the Court which is already over 20 years old is still limited by the general 
rule according to which the control function of the general EU budget and the budgetary 
sovereignty of the European Parliament and the Council shall not be undermined. 
Furthermore, three specificities of the EDP have to be taken into account, which show that 
the reasoning applied to the EDP cannot be generalised: First, the EDP creates obligations 
of the Member States vis-à-vis third countries outside of the EU and not vis-à-vis other EU 
Member States. Second, the European Parliament has, at least, to discharge the 
Commission for the financial management of the EDF, excluding operations managed by 
                                          
2 This conclusion can be questioned after the “Pringle” judgment of the ECJ (ECJ 2012). According to the Court the 
establishment of the ESM was in conformity with the EU Treaties regardless of the entry into force of Article 
136(3) TFEU. The ECJ did not comment on whether the Union could establish the ESM on the basis of Article 352 
TFEU (para 67). This could imply that the Union could also have established the ESM within the EU framework. An 
action under Article 352 TFEU or under a separate international Treaty is, however, according to the ECJ at the 
discretion of EU Member States. 
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the EIB according to Article 11(8) of the Internal Agreement on the financing of Community 
aid (OJ L 247, 9.9.2006, p. 32). Third, every EU Member State takes part in the EDF calling 
themselves “Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the 
Council”. Therefore, even though the Council as an institution is left outside all the 
governments within the Council are involved in the EDF. 
2.2.3.4. Expenditure resulting from implementation of enhanced cooperation as an 
exception? 
 
The last specificity of the EDF triggers the question as to whether a group of EU Member 
States could establish such a fund. Further guidance can be found in Article 332 TFEU on 
expenditure resulting from implementation of enhanced cooperation. According to Article 
332 TFEU such expenditure other than administrative costs entailed for the Union 
institutions shall be borne, in principle, by the participating Member States. The wording of 
this provision appears to allow that a group of Member States can establish such a fund 
and even to require putting it outside of the general EU budget. 
 
The main idea of Article 332 TFEU, however, is rather that non-participating Member States 
should not bear costs of decisions on which they have no political influence. It is not clear 
whether expenditure resulting from implementation of enhanced cooperation has to be 
borne outside of or within the EU budget. Article 326 TFEU states in this respect that any 
enhanced cooperation shall comply with the Treaties and Union law and, by that, does not 
allow any deviation from general EU law and principles of EU budget law. 
2.2.3.5. Exceptions based on tasks with competences shared between EU and Member 
States vis-à-vis other EU Member States 
 
Finally, the question arises as to whether the Court’s reasoning on Member States’ freedom 
to create financial obligations vis-à-vis third countries outside of the EU framework would 
also be applicable to the creation of financial obligations vis-à-vis other EU Member States. 
In its judgment the Court paid special attention to the division of competences: As long as 
the Member States have the right to act they can act outside of the EU framework and 
create obligations outside of the EU budget. Following the same rationale with regard to an 
internal action Article 2(2) TFEU on the shared competences clarifies that the “Member 
States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence.” In contrast to shared competences in external relations shared competences 
in internal affairs can create obstacles to the right of a Member State to act if the Union has 
exercised its competence. This difference relates to the fact that a joint action of EU 
Member States vis-à-vis each other competes against legislative acts under Article 288 
TFEU. 
 
As long as the Union did not exercise its competence Member States are still bound by 
Article 4(3) TFEU and its principle of sincere cooperation. This principle requires that 
Member States are not allowed to undermine the purpose of a proposed action. The ECJ 
has held that “Member States are subject to special duties of action and abstention in a 
situation in which the Commission has submitted to the Council proposals which, although 
they have not been adopted by the Council, represent the point of departure for concerted 
Community action” (ECJ 1981: para 28). 
 
All in all, the Court’s decision on the creation of financial obligations by the Member States 
outside of the EU framework in case of shared competences vis-à-vis third countries is, in 
principle, applicable to a joint action of the Member States vis-à-vis each other. This is, 
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however, limited by the legislative action already undertaken by the Union. Consequently, 
the establishment of a fund outside of the EU framework but only concerning EU Member 
States depends on whether and to which extent the functions this fund has to fulfil are 
already subject of existing or proposed EU legislation. 
2.2.3.6. Summary: Fiscal capacity as a possible exception? 
 
The establishment of a fiscal capacity outside of the EU budget can be seen as a 
permissible exception to the principle of unity of the EU budget and its completeness if its 
function can only be realised outside of the EU framework. The two functions of the fiscal 
capacity that the President of the European Council proposed fall partly within the EU’s 
shared competence on social and territorial cohesion. It therefore has to be examined to 
which extent the two functions would undermine existing EU initiatives which can only be 
done on the basis of concrete proposals. 
 
The establishment of an agency with an own legal personality would not be as such a 
permissible exception to the principle of unity of the EU budget and its completeness. As 
the purpose of not excluding Union agencies from this principle is to safeguard the 
budgetary sovereignty of the European Parliament an agency with an own legal personality 
would only be such an exception if the establishing act provides for a Parliamentarian 
budgetary supervision that is comparable to the one in the EU budget. 
 
2.2.4. Possibilities of differentiation within the EU budget 
 
Whilst it is shown that under certain conditions the establishment of a fiscal capacity 
outside of the EU budget could be a permissible exception to the principle of unity of the EU 
budget and its completeness, it remains to be assessed whether a differentiation with 
regard to the revenue and the expenditure within the EU budget is possible.  
 
The general budget of the EU is financed by own resources and other revenues. The own 
resources are defined in the Council decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom on the system of the 
European Communities’ own resources (OJ L 163, 23.6.2007, p. 17) (hereinafter: Own 
Resources Decision). These are levies and tariff duties, VAT-based own resources and GNI-
based own resources. The latter is at the moment a uniform rate to the sum of all the 
Member States’ GNIs. In accordance with the procedure laid down Article 311(3) TFEU the 
Union may also establish a new category of own resources that is financed by contributions 
from a certain group of Member States with a higher rate.  
 
With regard to expenditure Article 6 of the Own Resources Decision states that “the 
revenue […] shall be used without distinction to finance all expenditure entered in the 
general budget of the European Union.” The wording appears to preclude any 
differentiation. One has, however, to distinguish the establishment of expenditure that is 
directly linked to a certain own resource, which is prohibited, and the establishment of new 
budget heading only for a group of Member States without any direct link to an own 
resource. The latter case is legally possible under the Own Resources Decision and the 
regulation on financial rules.  Article 18 of the 2002 regulation on financial rules as well as 
Article 21 of the 2012 regulation on financial rules allows for assigning certain revenues to 
certain expenditures. These revenues are called “assigned revenues” and can only be used 
for the budget line these revenues are assigned to. The assignment can legally be made by 
the basic act on the assigned revenue. A new own resource could therefore increase the 
general budget by the amount that contributes to this new budget line. 
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A comparable differentiation with regard to other revenue has already been adopted with 
Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the Euro area. According to this article “the interest earned by the 
Commission shall constitute other revenue as referred to in Article 311 TFEU and shall be 
assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility.” This regulation defines payment 
obligations only for Euro area Member States and the EFSF to which the revenue is 
allocated is a body exclusively composed by Euro area Member States. 
 
2.2.5. Borrowing-and-lending operations entered into by the Union 
 
A special issue are borrowing-and-lending operations entered into by the Union: Article 
14(2) of the 2002 regulation on the financial rules as well Article 17(2) of the 2012 
regulation on financial rules state that “the Union and [Union agencies], may not raise 
loans within the framework of the budget.” At the same time, the Union already raised such 
loans with regard to balancing of payment difficulties caused by the increase in prices of 
petroleum products (cf. regulation (EEC) No 397/75), to assisting non-eurozone Member 
States which are experiencing or are seriously threatened with difficulties in their balance 
of current payments (cf. regulation (EC) No 332/2002) or to financing investment projects 
which contribute to greater convergence and integration of the economic policies of the 
Member States (cf. Council decision 78/870/EEC). Revenue of these loans is, moreover, 
considered to be other revenue of the EU budget in terms of Article 311 TFEU.  
 
This contradiction can be explained by the fact that based on Article 352 TFEU the Union is 
allowed to enter into borrowing-and-lending operations for specific purposes such as the 
above-mentioned ones. In order to contribute to the general EU budget, however, the 
Union is not entitled to raise loans. 
 
The integration of the additional fiscal capacity into the general EU budget would not 
prevent to provide for an ability to borrow for it. This ability must be restricted to a specific 
purpose and the guarantees for its borrowing-and-lending operations must be mentioned in 
the general EU budget. Borrowing-and-lending operations as such are not part of the 
general budget. 
 
2.3. Implications of the legal framework on possible concepts for a 
fiscal capacity 
 
The legal framework as set by the Treaties reduces the possible concepts for a fiscal 
capacity to those in which the European Parliament is a supervisory body comparable to its 
role with regard to the EU budget: Either the fiscal capacity is integrated into the EU budget 
or if outside of the EU budget it has to be established on the basis of Article 352 TFEU in 
enhanced cooperation between the participating Member States or based on an 
international Treaty between these Member States including such a Parliamentarian control. 
 
2.3.1. Integration into the EU budget 
 
The integration into the EU budget does not require an integration of the fiscal capacity into 
the multi-annual financial framework although, according to Article 312(1) TFEU, the 
annual budget of the Union shall comply with the multi-annual financial framework. 
Paragraph 11 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (OJ C 
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139, 14.6.2006, p. 1) provides for an exception for “revenue earmarked within the 
meaning of Article 18 of the [2002] Financial Regulation” (so called “assigned revenue”): 
“The financial framework does not take account of budget items financed by [such] 
revenue.” Furthermore, the integration of the fiscal capacity into the EU budget would 
require an amendment of the Own Resources Decision on the basis of Article 311(3) TFEU 
as well as the establishment of a new budget line for financing the functions foreseen for 
the fiscal capacity. 
 
2.3.2. Fund for the eurozone Member States outside of the EU budget  
 
The fiscal capacity can also be established outside of the EU budget based on Article 352 
TFEU or an international Treaty. Its implementation could be assigned to the European 
Commission or a new separate agency. This would, however, infringe the principle of unity 
of the EU budget and its completeness under Article 310(1) TFEU if the basic act does not 
provide for supervision by the European Parliament comparable to the EU budget. 
Otherwise, the establishment of the fiscal capacity outside of the EU budget would 
undermine the budgetary sovereignty of the European Parliament and the democratic 
control of the Union’s revenue and expenditure. 
3. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE “CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS” 
 
A core element of the idea of an additional fiscal capacity is the combination of the 
establishment of such a capacity with the conclusion of “contractual arrangements” by 
Member States with EU institutions. They were called “individual arrangements of a 
contractual nature with the EU institutions on the reforms promoting growth and jobs” (van 
Rompuy 2012b: 7), “contractual arrangements to be concluded between the Commission 
and Member States” (European Commission 2012: 42) or “mutually agreed contracts for 
competitiveness and growth” (European Council 2012: 5). The conclusion of such a 
“contractual arrangement” is seen as a necessary condition in order to receive financial 
assistance from the funds of the fiscal capacity. 
3.1. Elements of definition of “contractual arrangements” 
 
According to the different official documents on the idea of “contractual arrangements” the 
following elements on what “contractual arrangements” are can be identified: 
 
 Concluding parties are the Member States and EU institutions/Commission; 
 Contractual arrangements are included in the European Semester; 
 Content is based on the country-specific recommendations adopted by the Council, 
based on a proposal by the Commission, under Article 121(2) TFEU; 
 For Member States under the corrective arm of the MIP the Corrective Action Plan 
(Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011) would correspond to the contractual 
arrangements; 
 For Member States under the preventive arm of the MIP (cf. Article 6 of Regulation 
(EU) No 1176/2011)3, the contractual arrangements would consist of an action plan 
similar to that required under the corrective arm; 
                                          
3 Art. 6 states: “If, on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in Article 5, the Commission considers that a 
Member State is experiencing imbalances, it shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the Eurogroup 
accordingly. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may address the necessary 
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 The arrangement needs the “endorsement” of the national parliament where 
appropriate under national procedures. 
 
There is a divergence in the official documents with regard to the mandatory nature of the 
conclusion of “contractual arrangements”: 
 
 Mandatory for all Euro area Member States (European Council 2012: 5; van Rompuy 
2012c: 11) 
 Mandatory for Member States under the Corrective Arm of the MIP (European 
Commission 2012: 43) 
3.2. Legal nature of “contractual arrangements” 
 
Contracts concluded by Member States with EU institutions can be International law 
Treaties, Memoranda of Understanding, contracts governed by public law or contracts 
governed by private law.  
 
3.2.1. Preliminary remark: Capacity to conclude contracts or Treaties 
 
In order to conclude “contractual agreements”, the contracting parties need to have the 
capacity to conclude contracts or Treaties. Whilst Member States possess the capacity to 
conclude contracts or Treaties according to general International law EU institutions do not 
have such a capacity. The EU has according to Article 47 TEU legal personality which 
includes the capacity to conclude contracts (Article 335 TFEU) or Treaties. The same applies 
to the ECB according to Article 282(3) TFEU and to the EIB according to Article 308 TFEU. 
All other EU institutions and, in particular, the European Commission do not have a legal 
personality and cannot conclude contracts in their names. They can only conclude contracts 
on behalf of the “European Union”. The same applies to the conclusion of “Memoranda of 
Understanding” in order to receive stability support from the ESM: According to Article 
13(4) of the ESM-Treaty the European Commission signs the “Memorandum of 
Understanding” on behalf of the ESM. Therefore, EU institutions cannot conclude 
“contractual arrangements” with Member States but only the EU. 
 
3.2.2. International law Treaties 
 
Taking account of the above-mentioned elements of definition of “contractual 
arrangements” it appears to be rather unlikely that these are International law Treaties. 
Firstly, it is already unclear whether the EU has the right to conclude International law 
Treaties with its own Member States.4 Article 216(1) TFEU only enables the EU to conclude 
agreements with third countries or international organisations but not with a Member State. 
This can be explained by the fact that the EU can always address Member States by means 
provided for in Article 288 TFEU (regulations, directives and decisions), but only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon the EU (Article 5(2) TEU). The conclusion of an 
International law Treaty within the scope of application of a legal basis in the Treaties 
would undermine the legislative procedure foreseen by this basis. The conclusion of an 
International law Treaty by the EU outside of the scope of application of any legal basis in 
the Treaties would infringe the principle of conferral in Article 5 TEU. “Contractual 
                                                                                                                                     
recommendations to the Member State concerned, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 121(2) 
TFEU.” 
4 This has to be distinguished from the case of the so-called “mixed agreements”. Such agreements are concluded 
both by the EU and by the Member States on the one side and third countries or international organisations on the 
other side in case the content of an agreement is subject to shared Union competences. 
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arrangements” understood as International law Treaties concluded by the EU would 
therefore conflict with the EU Treaties. 
 
Secondly, the Commission blueprint referred to an “endorsement of the national parliament 
where appropriate under national procedures”. An International law Treaty, however, 
requires a ratification which is more than an “endorsement”. The “contractual 
arrangements” can therefore not be considered to be International law Treaties. 
 
3.2.3. Contracts governed by public law or private law 
 
Contracts governed by public law or private law are legally binding agreements voluntarily 
concluded by two or more parties containing an obligation to do or not to do for one or 
more of the parties and granting the other party the right to demand the performance of 
the promised obligation. The distinctive feature is therefore the will of the parties to legally 
bind them. 
 
Taking a closer look into the official documents one cannot identify an element according to 
which Member States should bind themselves legally to implement the measures on which 
they agreed in the contractual arrangements. The contractual arrangements are integrated 
into the European Semester. For Member States that are under the corrective arm of the 
MIP the contractual arrangement equals the corrective action plan under Article 8 of 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. Under Article 8 these Member States are bound to the 
corrective action plan. The Commission monitors the implementation (Article 9) and if a 
Member State fails in doing so, the Council can decide on surveillance missions (Article 
10(4)) and, in case the Member State is part of the euro area, on sanctions (Article 3 of 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011). Under these circumstances there is no need for an 
additional legal obligation under a contractual arrangement.  
 
If, furthermore, a Member State is under the preventive arm of the MIP the official 
documents state with regard to the content of the contractual arrangements that these 
would consist of an action plan similar to that required under the corrective arm. Non-
compliance, however, would not lead to sanctions. The official documents therefore do not 
provide for any further legal consequences if such a Member State concludes a contractual 
arrangement. 
 
The only consequence that is linked to the fact that Member States have concluded 
contractual arrangements is that they are entitled to claim financial support from the fiscal 
capacity.  
 
In sum, Member States are not supposed to create additional legal obligations by 
concluding contractual arrangements with the EU. By consequence, the contractual 
arrangements cannot be qualified as contracts governed by public law or private law. 
 
3.2.4. Memoranda of Understanding 
 
The elements given by the official documents resemble “Memoranda of Understandings” 
(MoU) as provided for in Article 13(3) of the ESM-Treaty. MoU are legally not binding 
agreements in which the parties declare their intention to act. They can be classified as 
Treaties but do not require any ratification. Compliance with MoUs can be ensured by 
incentives, so that financial assistance is only granted if there is compliance and withheld if 
there is non-compliance. 
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The main purpose of the “contractual arrangements” is an incentive-based enforcement of 
country-specific recommendations in addition to sanctions where sanctions legally can be 
imposed (such as for Member States under the corrective arm of the MIP). Where sanctions 
cannot be imposed legally (such as for Member States under the preventive arm of the 
MIP) it is the only means of enforcement. 
3.3. Legal framework for “contractual arrangements” 
 
The legal framework for “contractual agreements” is set by Article 121 TFEU and Articles 
310 et seqq. TFEU. 
 
3.3.1. Legal framework for the conclusion of “contractual arrangements” 
 
The conclusion of “contractual arrangements” falls within the scope of application of Article 
121 TFEU and the multilateral surveillance procedure. The purpose of “contractual 
arrangements” is to strengthen the enforcement of country-specific recommendations 
under Article 121(2) TFEU. The enforcement of country-specific recommendations is, 
however, restricted to a warning addressed to a Member State that can be made public. 
Any further enforcement could therefore infringe Article 121(4) TFEU. 
 
The incentive-based enforcement of “contractual arrangements” does not infringe Article 
121(4) TFEU. Although this is an enforcement measure that is not foreseen by this Article, 
it does not worsen the position of this Member State in case of non-compliance with the 
“contractual arrangement”. Prior to the conclusion of a “contractual arrangement” this 
Member State would have no right to claim financial assistance as it has no right to claim it 
after conclusion of this contract in case of non-compliance. Legally, its position is the same 
with or without conclusion of a “contractual arrangement”. Therefore, an incentive-based 
enforcement measure would not infringe Article 121(4) TFEU. 
 
3.3.2. No involvement of the European Parliament in the conclusion of “contractual 
arrangements” 
 
As the conclusion of “contractual arrangement” falls within the scope of application of the 
multilateral surveillance, the European Parliament cannot take part in the conclusion of the 
“contractual arrangement”. The “contractual arrangements” shall have the same content as 
the country-specific recommendations. These recommendations are adopted by the 
Council, based on a proposal by the Commission, under Article 121 TFEU. A possible 
inclusion of the European Parliament in the conclusion of “contractual arrangements” would 
therefore extend Parliament rights to an area in which the Treaties do not provide for any 
involvement of the European Parliament.  
 
3.3.3. No obligation on Member States to conclude “contractual arrangements” 
 
Although the official documents declare the conclusion of “contract arrangements” to be 
mandatory for either Euro area Member States or Member States under the corrective arm 
of the MIP, there is no EU legal obligation for Member States to conclude such “contractual 
arrangements”. Member States remain free in declaring politically to conclude “contractual 
arrangements”. As these contractual arrangements are not foreseen by any EU legal act 
Member States, however, cannot be obliged to conclude them. A legal act establishing the 
additional fiscal capacity could nevertheless require the conclusion of such a “contractual 
arrangement” as a condition to receive financial assistance from it. 
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3.3.4. Implementation of “contractual arrangements” 
 
As mentioned above the budgetary part of the fiscal capacity falls within the scope of 
application of EU budget law. According to EU budget law the European Parliament controls 
the implementation of the EU budget. Therefore, the European Parliament should be 
included in the decision on whether a financial incentive is granted. The incentive-based 
enforcement of country-specific recommendations has a budgetary impact. This budgetary 
impact requires an involvement of the European Parliament when implementing the 
“contractual arrangements”. 
3.4. Institutional implications of the “contractual arrangements” 
 
“Contractual arrangements” understood as an additional enforcement measure of country-
specific recommendations with the legal nature of a legally not binding MoU whose 
compliance gives Member State the right to claim financial assistance from the additional 
fiscal capacity only has minor institutional implications: 
 
 for the European Commission: The European Commission has to negotiate the 
“contractual arrangements” and to sign them on behalf of the EU. As their content is 
the same as in country-specific recommendations or in corrective action plans, the 
Commission is already under the legal obligation to propose certain measures under 
Article 121 TFEU and under the MIP. This does not entail any further obligations. Under 
the MIP the Commission also has to monitor the compliance of Member States under 
the corrective arm. Therefore, only a monitoring task with regard to Member State 
under the preventive arm of the MIP creates an additional task for the Commission. 
 
 for the European Parliament: The European Parliament has no right to take part in 
the conclusion of the “contractual arrangements”. However, as the implementation has 
a budgetary impact the European Parliament has to control the implementation of the 
“contractual arrangements”. Unlike the ESM, where the European Parliament has no 
right to control the implementation of the MoUs, granting financial assistance from the 
additional fiscal capacity requires Parliamentarian control as this decision falls into the 
scope of application of EU budget law. 
 
4. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FURTHER 
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE FISCAL CAPACITY 
 
Although the conclusions of the European Council of 13/14 December 2012 did not mention 
any further development options for an additional fiscal capacity, the final report of the 
President of the European Council (van Rompuy 2012c: 8) and the blueprint of the 
European Commission (European Commission 2012: 31) addressed this question: They 
were referring to “an insurance-type mechanism between euro area countries to buffer 
large country-specific economic shocks”. This could be either as an asymmetric shock 
absorption capacity or as a counter-cyclical economic tool (comparable to the US 
unemployment benefit system). 
 
Besides the question as to whether such further developments are economically convincing 
(cf. in this respect Wolff 2012) questions with regard to institutional changes are to be 
raised. Institutional implications are to be assessed in relation to the replies to the following 
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key questions for the direction that a further development of the additional fiscal capacity 
might take:  
 
 Sources of revenue: An extended version of the additional fiscal capacity requires 
either new sources of revenue or an extension of existing sources of revenue. Sources 
of revenue can be contributions by Member States (which entails the question on which 
basis these contributions are to be calculated and if they should be modified in case a 
Member State is either hit by an asymmetric shock or failed to reach certain reform 
and budget targets), own resources such as a proper EU tax (e.g. the financial 
transaction tax) or loans (which requires an ability to borrow which is not allowed for 
the current EU budget but not completely forbidden for specialised funds, c.f. 2.2.5, p. 
18). If a further developed fiscal capacity should be based on an own EU tax revenue 
or on loans a proper administration such as a Treasury needs to be established. 
 
 Conditions for payment: The payments can be made unconditional and only be based 
on certain macroeconomic indicators. Reaching the indicator triggers payments to this 
Member State. The spending will remain national. The alternative would be to earmark 
payments for a defined purpose (such as unemployment). Spending is then defined at 
EU level. The first option only requires proper administration at EU level and 
democratic control of the legal act that defines the macroeconomic indicators. The 
second option confers also the spending on the EU level. This requires an enhanced 
democratic control of the spending by EU institutions. 
 
 Decision-making for authorising payments: Payments can be automatic or based on 
discretion. If payments are automatic the mechanism establishing the automatic 
payment requires a legal act that should be co-decided by the European Parliament 
and the Council. If payments are based on a discretionary decision this discretionary 
power must be assigned to a certain body (European Commission or a specialised 
body) and the use of this discretionary power must be democratically controlled by the 
European Parliament. 
 
4.1. What is legally possible under the existing Treaties? 
 
Elements of these options for a further development of the additional fiscal capacity can 
already be realised under the existing Treaties. The legal options for the sources of revenue 
of such an extended version of the fiscal capacity (4.1.1) are to be examined followed by 
an assessment of possible legal bases for payments (4.1.2). Guidance for the conditions of 
payment (4.1.3) and decision-making for authorising payments (4.1.4) can also be found 
under the existing Treaties.  
 
4.1.1. Sources of revenue 
 
The extension of existing sources of revenue or the introduction of new sources of revenue 
for the extended additional fiscal capacity can be implemented by amending the Own 
Resources Decision according to the procedure laid down in Article 311(3) TFEU.  
 
Contributions by Member States require a distinction between Member States participating 
in the additional fiscal capacity and those which do not. Such differentiation within the EU 
budget is, in principle, legally possible (cf. 2.2.4). It can either be done by including a 
differentiation in the correction mechanisms foreseen by Articles 4 and 5 of the Own 
Resources Decision. In this case the contributions by Member States would be calculated on 
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the basis of GNI. Or a new category of contributions could be included in the Own 
Resources Decision for participating Member States with a different calculation basis. 
 
Financing by loans is currently forbidden for the general EU budget. It is, however, under 
the existing Treaties legally possible for specialised funds (cf. 2.2.5). If this also applies to 
a specialised fund, that exceeds a certain share of the EU budget and could therefore be 
considered as a circumvention of the prohibition for the general EU budget to be financed 
by loans, is, however, questionable.  
 
An own EU tax can be introduced under the existing Treaties in two steps: Firstly, the EU 
tax has to be established on a legal basis. Secondly, the own EU tax has to be included as a 
new own resource in the Own Resources Decision according to the procedure laid down in 
Article 311(3) TFEU. Article 311 TFEU does not provide for any legal basis to establish 
taxes. 
 
The Union can adopt measures in tax matters on the basis of Article 113 TFEU concerning 
indirect taxes, Article 115 TFEU concerning direct taxes, Article 192(2)(1)(a) TFEU 
concerning environmental taxes, Article 194(3) TFEU concerning energy taxes and Article 
352 TFEU. Article 115 TFEU only serves as a basis for tax legislation by means of directives. 
An own EU tax can only be created by means of a regulation. Article 113 TFEU is not 
restricted to directives but requires a “harmonisation of legislation”. The establishment of 
an own EU tax can hardly be considered as a “harmonisation”. Although the ECJ decided 
that the establishment of an own EU agency can be done by means of regulation on the 
basis of Article 114 TFEU, that requires “approximation”, such an establishment is only 
possible “in order to facilitate the uniform implementation and application of acts based on 
that provision” (ECJ 2006: para 44). As long as the establishment of an EU agency (or tax) 
facilitates an existing EU legal act it can be based on “harmonising” legal bases. An own EU 
tax, however, cannot be considered as an “annex” to an existing EU legal act. It is not 
“harmonisation” in terms of Article 113 TFEU. Articles 192 and 194 TFEU allow for the 
adoption of “provisions” (Article 192 TFEU) and “measures” (Article 194 TFEU) if they are 
“primarily of a fiscal nature”. This includes regulations. Except for those very specific fields, 
the only remaining legal basis for the establishment of an own EU tax would be Article 352 
TFEU. There can be, however, no legislation based on Article 352 TFEU if an overall 
assessment of all possible legal bases results in the conclusion that legislating on the basis 
of Article 352 TFEU would amount to a circumvention of the division of competences 
between the EU and Member States. The Treaties only provided for a possibility to adopt 
“measures” in very specific fields (environment and energy). In all other fields of taxation it 
only provides for harmonisation of Member States’ legislation and the adoption of 
directives. This means, conversely, that the Treaties do not provide for any legal basis for 
an own EU tax which cannot be circumvented by relying on Article 352 TFEU (Mayer & 
Heidfeld 2011: 375).5 
 
This finding is supported by the fact that the introduction of an own EU tax requires an 
enhanced democratic control which is not foreseen by the existing legal bases in tax 
matters. Articles 113 and 115 TFEU only require a consultation of the European Parliament 
and Article 352 TFEU only requires consent by the European Parliament. Taxation, however, 
requires representation. The creation of a future legal base for an EU tax whose purpose is 
to generate revenue for the EU needs a complete involvement of the European Parliament 
                                          
5 This could be seen differently with regard to the introduction of the financial transaction tax if the main purpose 
of this tax is not to generate revenue for the EU but a steering effect with regard to financial transactions. The 
introduction of a financial transaction tax as a Member States’ tax whose revenue is assigned partly or completely 
as an own resource of the EU budget remains, however, possible under the existing Treaties. 
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and special rules on taxation in Primary law (comparable to a financial constitution) 
(Waldhoff 2012: 12). 
 
4.1.2. Legal basis for payments 
 
A legal basis for payments can be found in Article 352 TFEU as long as payments are 
necessary in order to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties and provided that 
the Treaties either do not contain any specific competence or do not exclude any EU 
competence.  
 
The idea of an EU basic unemployment insurance (Dullien 2007) according to which “the 
fiscal capacity would work as a complement or partial substitute to national unemployment 
insurance systems” (van Rompuy 2012c: 9) cannot be implemented on the basis of Article 
352 TFEU. Rules on unemployment insurance can, in principle, be introduced on the basis 
of Article 153(1)(c) TFEU as a minimum benefit system as long as it is not inconsistent with 
the fundamental principles of Member States’ social security systems and part of the 
national unemployment insurances. A complement or partial substitute to national 
unemployment insurance systems, however, cannot be established on this basis since 
Article 153(2) TFEU only allows legislation by means of directives, which require a 
transposition into national law. Adopting such rules on the basis of Article 352 TFEU would 
circumvent Article 153 TFEU. Therefore, such payments would need a legal basis to be 
created by a Treaty change. 
 
4.1.3. Conditions for payment 
 
Whilst unconditional payments based only on the transgression of certain macro-economic 
indicators where the spending remains national appears easier to realise under the existing 
institutional configuration of the EU as it would not require the establishment of an EU 
Treasury, such payments could infringe Article 125 TFEU. The ECJ decided that Article 125 
TFEU, which addresses “financial assistance” by the EU or the Member States, is not 
intended to prohibit either the Union or the Member States from granting any form of 
financial assistance whatever to another Member State” (ECJ 2012: para 132). Article 125 
TFEU prohibits, however, “the Union and the Member States from granting financial 
assistance as a result of which the incentive of the recipient Member State to conduct a 
sound budgetary policy is diminished.” Therefore, “the activation of financial assistance […] 
is not compatible with Article 125 TFEU unless it is indispensable for the safeguarding of the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and subject to strict conditions” (para 136). 
Whilst it can be argued that granting financial assistance in order to buffer large country-
specific economic shocks is “indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of 
the euro area as a whole”, payments cannot be activated unconditionally. Therefore, 
unconditional payments based only on the transgression of certain macro-economic 
indicators where the spending remains national conflict with Article 125 TFEU. 
 
Earmarking payments for defined purposes appears rather to be in conformity with Article 
125 TFEU as understood by the ECJ. Such conditionality in which the EU level defines the 
spending requires, however, deep modifications of EU’s institutional structure. This could 
include the creation of an EU Treasury with an appropriate Parliamentarian control. 
 
4.1.4. Decision-making for authorising payments 
 
A mechanism according to which the fulfilment of certain criteria automatically triggers 
payments to a participating Member States appears to be in conformity with Article 125 
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TFEU. Although it could be inferred from the term “liable” that “automatism” is per se 
forbidden by this provision the judgment of the ECJ in the “Pringle” case only refers to two 
conditions for a financial assistance to meet in order to be in compliance with the Treaties: 
The payment must be, firstly, indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of 
the euro area as a whole and, secondly, subject to strict conditions. As long as the strict 
conditions are met, an automatism of payment appears to be possible.  
 
A discretionary decision-making as known under the ESM-Treaty does not give rise to legal 
objections with regard to Article 125 TFEU. Such a political decision-making procedure 
requires, however, deep modifications of EU’s institutional structure, especially with regard 
to democratic accountability. 
4.2. Establishment of a Treasury  
 
Some of the options for a further development of the additional fiscal capacity require an 
enhanced administrative body in order to manage them This is called the establishment of 
a Treasury by the blueprint of the Commission (European Commission 2012: 33, 38, 40) 
and the final report of the President of the European Council (van Rompuy 2012c: 9). 
 
Such a task could be entrusted to the European Commission or to a separate body. 
Assigning it to a body separate to the Commission would, however, undermine the 
Commission’s position among the EU institutions, weaken the Commission’s general 
position within the EU administration and, by that, violate the principle of institutional 
balance. 
 
The establishment of a Treasury requires an enhanced democratic accountability. This can 
be done in two ways: 
 
 The Commission as a college is responsible towards the European Parliament: This 
corresponds to the legal situation according to Article 234 TFEU. There can be only a 
motion of censure on the activities of the Commission as a whole. This entails further 
questions that are not be explored in this note: Is it still convincing that the 
Commission is responsible as a college if it concerns decisions which only have an 
impact on Member States participating in the additional fiscal capacity? Is the decision-
making within the Commission according to which it shall act by majority of its 
Members (Article 250 TFEU) a convincing decision-making for Treasury decision? Is it 
reasonable to have a motion of censure against the whole Commission if there were 
particular wrong decisions by the Treasury? Is it an appropriate democratic control of a 
Treasury if a motion of censure always has to be tabled on the Commission as a college 
instead of a motion on the Commissioner responsible for the Treasury? 
 
 The head of the Treasury is directly responsible towards the European Parliament and, 
by consequence, should be elected by the European Parliament with the possibility of a 
motion of censure on his activities. If the Treasury is assigned to the Commission and, 
within the Commission, to the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, acting 
as Vice-President of the Commission, the rules just mentioned would be applied to this 
Commissioner. This would require a Treaty change as under the existing Treaty only 
the Commission as a college is responsible towards the European Parliament and no 
single Commissioner can be elected by the European Parliament. Such a design would 
conflict with the existing principle of collegiality of the Commission as described above. 
The purpose of the principle of collegiality is to ensure an internal checks and balances 
within the Commission. This lack of internal checks and balances would, however, be 
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outweighed by an enhanced external checks and balances exercised by the 
democratically elected European Parliament 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The additional EMU fiscal capacity can be understood, according to the official documents, 
in two ways. The first is an incentive-based enforcement instrument for country-specific 
recommendations under Article 121 TFEU. After the conclusion of “contractual 
arrangements”, understood as legally non-binding “Memoranda of Understanding”, 
concluding Member States can receive financial assistance from the additional fiscal 
capacity in case of compliance. It would then be an additional enforcement mechanism. A 
different understanding of “contractual arrangements” would conflict with the Treaties. The 
revenue and the expenditure of such an additional fiscal capacity are subject to EU budget 
law and its principles. Accordingly, the European Parliament has to assume a supervisory 
role over the fiscal capacity. It cannot be part in the negotiation and conclusion procedure 
of “contractual arrangements” but in their implementation. A differentiation of revenue and  
expenditure is possible under EU budget law. Certain revenue can be assigned to certain 
budget line. Such earmarked revenue is not part of the Multiannual Financial Framework. 
Such an additional fiscal capacity can be realised under the existing Treaties. 
 
The second way of understanding the additional EMU fiscal capacity is to be an insurance-
type mechanism between euro area countries to buffer large country-specific economic 
shocks. Such a fiscal capacity requires own and increased revenue. Such revenue could be 
realised under the existing Treaties as long as these are Member States’ contributions or a 
share of Member States’ taxes such as a national financial transaction tax. Own EU taxes 
whose purpose is to generate revenue for the EU cannot be established under the existing 
Treaties. The institutional framework of the EU is also not adapted to such a situation. The 
implementation of such a fiscal capacity can be done under the existing Treaties as long as 
it indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole 
and subject to strict conditions. Unconditional financial assistance which is granted only by 
transgressing certain macroeconomic indicators is not in compliance with the Treaties. 
Deciding on these payments is under such conditions a highly political question and an 
administrative challenge that requires the establishment of a Treasury. Such a Treasury 
should be established with the European Commission. Under the existing Treaties, a proper 
democratic accountability of such a Treasury is not possible. In sum, only elements of an 
additional EMU fiscal capacity understood as an insurance-type mechanism between euro 
area countries to buffer large country-specific economic shocks can be realised under 
existing EU law. Especially questions on the democratic accountability cannot be solved in a 
satisfactory manner and require Treaty changes. 
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